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OCI No. 2803

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
6 October 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The India-Pakistan Situation
(Report #103 - As of 4:00 P.M. EDT)

1. Pakistan on 6 October delivered a note to UN Secretary General Thant warning that India is about to embark on major offensive operations which would destroy the cease-fire agreement. (Pakistan's earlier warning of an Indian attack in the Chhamb area about 1 October was correct. The Indian action near Chhamb between 1 and 4 October apparently aimed at taking high ground overlooking Pakistani rear lines, but it was unsuccessful.) A Pakistani foreign affairs officer told the American Ambassador on 5 October that the Indian army was regrouping in the Sialkot-Lahore-Kasur sectors and that the Indian 23rd Infantry Division, a US-armed mountain unit, had moved to Kasur. The Pakistani government expects an attack in the Kasur-Khem Karan sector.

2. Other reports indicate that Indian forces are continuing their efforts to seize command of strategic points or to establish a no-man's-land along the whole cease-fire line.

3. In a discussion in New York on 5 October, the French and Soviet representatives to the United Nations in effect charged that UN Secretary General Thant had exceeded his authority in establishing UN observer missions to monitor the Indo-Pakistani cease-fire and in suggesting a four-power commission to oversee implementation of the UN's 20 September cease-fire resolution. The French representative indicated that the Security Council, rather than the Secretary General was competent to establish and administer any observer mission. He said the four-power commission idea was a failure because the parties involved (US, UK, France, USSR) were opposed to it. He suggested that the entire Security Council might constitute itself as a commission.

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4. The Soviet representative stated that the USSR had not intended to give the UN Secretary General carte blanche and that the Security Council should discuss all decisions made by the Secretary General to make clear that these were within the Council's competence. He said the Security Council should not transfer its competence to a four-power commission.

5. Neither the French nor the Soviet representative was swayed by Ambassador Goldberg's arguments that implementation of the 20 September resolution was the important point--not a debate over U Thant's authority to do what he has done--and that U Thant had acted within the authority given him by the resolution.

6. UN Undersecretary Bunche, dismayed at the French-Soviet challenge to the competence of the Secretary General, indicated that the four-power commission concept was now "moribund". He stated, however, that the Security Council might have to meet shortly to discuss cease-fire violations, essentially negative Indian and Pakistani replies to the UN's call for withdrawal of forces to 5 August positions, and a report on the latest deployment of observers.

7. Indian Defense Minister Chavan on 4 October, in another anti-Western speech, told a mammoth public gathering of 500,000 persons in Bombay that Western countries had "failed" India and that Indian foreign policy must be reshaped. He said that a new, unified, mature India is prepared for all eventualities and will fight alone if necessary. He foresaw a long, drawn-out war with Pakistan.

8. About 29 September, Chinese Communist premier Chou En-lai told a group of Indonesian leaders in Peking that China wants to work out a special agreement for economic cooperation among China, Indonesia, Cambodia, North Korea, and Pakistan. He described these countries as a "special, anti-imperialist grouping." On 6 October, the Malaysian Foreign Ministry - hitting back at Pakistan's severance of diplomatic relations on 5 October - said "Malaysia has for some time been watching with growing concern the emergence of a sinister pattern of collusion among...Communist China, Indonesia, and Pakistan."

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9. The joint communique issued on 4 October at the close of Indian President Radhakrishnan's visit to Yugoslavia states that Radhakrishnan and Tito agreed that the Indo-Pakistani conflict resulted from "external attempts to impose by force concepts and solutions on a question which constitutes an internal affair of India." Tito also considered very dangerous for the world "the attempts of third countries (obviously Communist China) to interfere, especially by creating a border dispute, delivering ultimatums, and threatening the use of force."

10. Yugoslavia, which has long been friendly to India and antagonistic to Communist China, is virtually unique among foreign countries in agreeing with India that Kashmir is an internal affair.

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11. An official Pakistani spokesman released to the press and the UN observer mission on 5 October a map showing 1,617 square miles of Indian territory now alleged to be in Pakistani hands and only 436 square miles of Pakistani territory now held by Indian forces. The biggest Pakistani claims are in Rajasthan state, where Pakistani troops are said to be 25 to 30 miles across the Indian border. The Indian press has for the past several weeks admitted only Pakistani raids on Rajasthan police posts two to five miles inside its border. Pakistan presumably is releasing this map partly to shake the Indian public's confidence in the great victory supposedly won by the Indian army and partly to provide Pakistan with a strong bargaining position when the matter of withdrawals from enemy territory is officially raised in negotiations.

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